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as a conscious and self-determining agent. From this point of view, man is "supernatural." And here is to be found the best key we possess to the solution of the ultimate problem of the universe. For, as it is excellently put, "whether conscious perception by man is a transitory or a permanent fact in the universe, matter, apart from all perception of it, is an empty, unactual abstraction. Conscious life is the light of the world." But it is not to be supposed that man's consciousness provides a principle capable of giving a perfect solution. "The human finality is not offered as the conception of God taken from the divine centre—only as the conception of God necessarily taken at a human stand-point away from the centre. It is only offered as the best conception possible at the intermediate position." "It may be that which, when held intelligently by man, alone puts *him* in absolute rational harmony with the universe, and its acceptance then becomes the condition of success in the endeavor to live according to the deepest and truest *human* relation to what is real."

It is interesting to note that this conception is far nearer to the traditional Christian conception than to the Deism which makes the Divine unity—the ultimate unity of the universe—to be the unity of a single Person. But how much nearer, it is scarcely possible to say; for, in this First Series, Professor Fraser confesses he has "hardly passed the threshold."

CHARLES F. D'ARCY.

BALLYMENA, IRELAND.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN. By W. H. Fairbrother, M.A., Lecturer in Philosophy at Lincoln College, Oxford. London: Methuen & Co., 36 Essex Street, Strand, 1896.

This is a modest, careful, and useful little book. No one will find it in any way a substitute for the philosophic teaching of which it aims at being a "simple, plain exposition," but no one could desire less than Mr. Fairbrother that it should be used as such a substitute.

"It is solely," he says, "in the belief that a short, straightforward account of Green's method of working, with the results thereby arrived at, may indirectly help to promote the study of his writings, that these few pages have been written."

The substance of the book "was originally given in the form of lectures to students of philosophy at Oxford," and, although the

lectures have been "recast and rewritten" before publication, the book bears unmistakable traces of its origin. This is a distinct gain from the point of view of its purpose.

In a short introductory chapter Mr. Fairbrother explains that "Green's philosophy begins with Metaphysics, and is based entirely upon Metaphysics." This clearing of the ground was rendered necessary by the condition of current philosophic thought in England. Man seemed to have been reduced by that philosophy to "a being who is simply a result of natural forces." Green's question was, "'Is man simply a *natural* product in this sense?'"

In the following chapter Mr. Fairbrother sketches Green's method. "Green argues throughout from effect to cause. The 'effect' or result investigated in Metaphysics is 'that which exists,' and the only 'thing which exists' for a man necessarily and certainly to begin with, is that of which he is directly conscious in his individual self." "Hence 'What are the facts of my own individual consciousness?' and 'What is the simplest explanation I can give of the origin of these facts?' are the two primary questions of Metaphysics."

"The final outcome of this method of inquiry is the establishment of the three cardinal points—self, cosmos, God." The meaning for Green of these three terms is expounded by Mr. Fairbrother in a chapter called "The Results of Metaphysic." Green's relation to Locke and Kant are here dealt with, but, oddly enough, no mention is made of Hume, Green's trenchant criticism of whom is surely one of the most illuminating parts of his philosophic writings.

This chapter may be perhaps regarded as the crux of Mr. Fairbrother's achievement, and opinions will probably differ as to how he has surmounted it. If it be felt, by those who are familiar with Green's arguments, as somewhat inadequate and unconvincing, perhaps it may be contended that this is inevitable in an attempt to compress the gist of the whole first Book of the *Prolegomena* into thirty pages, and that enough has been done if an attractive and intelligible outline has been given which will induce students, daunted by the difficulty of Green's elaborate argument, to try once more, with this clue in their hands, to master the original. The present writer is aware of at least one case where this has happened with the happiest result.

"The Freedom of Man," "Moral Philosophy," and "Political Philosophy" are the headings of the remaining chapters of exposi-

tion. They run easily for all those who have understood the preliminary inquiry.

In the concluding chapter, "Green and His Critics," Mr. Fairbrother notices criticisms by Professor Sidgwick, Professor Seth, and Mr. A. J. Balfour. Mr. Fairbrother does little more than mention the points raised and then dismiss them as irrelevant.

Would it not have been more helpful to students of Green to have directed their attention to modern developments by idealistic writers (for instance, the recent treatment of theory of identity—by which much welcome light has been shed on difficulties in the *Prolegomena*) rather than to the objections of critics, two of whom, at least, they might well be excused from considering?

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

VIVISECTION: CAN IT ADVANCE MANKIND? By Charles Selby Oakley, M.A. Formerly Scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. 8vo. London: Dryden Press, J. Davy & Sons, 1895. Pp. 56. Price, sixpence.

Mr. Oakley's essay is an unusually fine specimen of anti-vivisection literature, for it is calm and dignified, while vivid with moral intensity. The vivisector who cares to answer it will have the satisfaction of dealing with a gentleman.

Mr. Oakley does not obscure the issues. He does not call the vivisector a blackguard, except in a far-off, polite sort of way; and he is too wise to deny that vivisection may have yielded results useful to the science of physiology and to the art of medicine. His argument is clear and simple: conscience is more than science, and the evolution of gentleness of more moment than the relief of disease. He appeals to the vivisector to forego the material gain to science and art, since it means a spiritual loss; it is counterbalanced by callousness, and by a dulling of moral charity.

Now, the spirit of this argument is so fine, and much of what the author says so welcome, that it seems ungrateful to say a word against it. And yet we must.

First, as to Mr. Oakley's assumptions. He assumes, though he expresses his willingness to prove, that there is a great deal of vivisection going on, if not in Britain, then elsewhere. It is difficult to deal with the wide elsewhere, but as to Britain we may be allowed to say that if there is *much* being practised here, it is without license and in secret, therefore in part self-condemned,